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Economic behavior of restaurant tipping
Abstract
This  paper  offers  a  thoughtful  discussion  of  social  norms  and  alternative  economic 
viewpoints and analysis of restaurant  tipping  behavior. A survey of Louisiana residents was 
conducted to collect public opinions about tipping. The analysis suggests that social norms are 
indeed the primary reason for diner tipping. As long as consumer behavior is guided by social 
norms, social norms  will create  costs  for diners. The conclusion suggests that  if  customer’s 
tipping behavior were completely guided by social norms and tips were not treated as the costs of 
servers’ services, tips would create excess burden in the restaurant food market.
1. Introduction
A fair amount of work on restaurant tipping has been done in the applied social psychology 
area, most notably by Michael Lynn. Within the economics field, economic models and analyses 
of tipping preceded empirical work by Ben-Zion and Karni (1977) and Schotter (1979). The 
recent research was initially mostly empirical (e.g., the work of Bodvarsson and Gibson in the 
1990s), but has recently turned more theoretical (e.g., the work of Azar in the 2000s). 
In  this  study,  I  provide  a  thoughtful  discussion  of  social  norms, alternative  economic 
viewpoints and analysis, and survey evidence to address the issue of restaurant tipping behavior. 
Moreover, this paper notes an interesting implied issue of whether tips create excess burden (i.e., 
deadweight loss) in the restaurant food market.
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I briefly review recent literature. In section 
3, I discuss the results of a survey conducted to collect public opinions about tipping. Section 4 
contains a thoughtful discussion of social norms and tipping rates. Section 5 includes discussions 
and arguments about whether tips would create excess burden. Finally, conclusion may be found 
in section 6.
2. A brief literature review
In this section, I briefly review the related literature, focusing in particular on seven articles
published since 1990 (Lynn and Grassman, 1990; Bodvarsson and Gibson, 1994; Bodvarsson 
and Gibson, 1997; Lynn and McCall, 2000; Conlin, Lynn, and O’Donoghue, 2003; Azar, 2004; 
and Kerr, Domazlicky, Kerr, and Knittel, 2006). These seven articles were selected for emphasis 
because they provide a clear, comprehensive, and valuable investigation of this issue.
In 1990, Lynn and Grassman selected a Red Lobster restaurant for a case study of tipping 
and interviewed 106 diners  on  four Thursday evenings during  March and  April 1988. They
tested three hypotheses: (1) diners use tips to buy social approval or avoid social disapproval; (2) 
diners use tips to buy an equitable exchange relationship with servers; and (3) diners use tips to 
buy  good  future  service.  As  a  result,  their  findings  suggested  that  tipping  was  positively 
associated with both patronage frequency and perceived service quality, but was not associated 
with interaction. Their results indicate that customers tipped in order to buy social approval and 2
equitable  relationships.  However,  their  findings  did  not  strongly  support  the  hypothesis that 
regular customers tipped in order to buy good future service. 
In 1994, Bodvarsson and Gibson gathered data from nearly 700 customers at seven different 
Minnesota restaurants in a study of bill size and tipping. They applied a simple econometric 
model to test four hypotheses: (1) tips are related to bill size, service quantity and quality; (2) 
frequent customers reward servers more for a given increase in bill size, service quantity and 
quality; (3) diners tip based upon a fixed percentage rule; and (4) service quality ratings supplied 
by diners and tips are not usually related. As a consequence, they concluded that tips depend on 
bill size because bill size and service quantity are highly correlated, which implies that tipping 
depends on service quantity, reflecting the server’s effort – the more the customer ordered, the 
greater the demand for the service and thus the more money is spent. Moreover, they further 
indicated that diners’ decision about how much to tip depends not only on the bill size but also 
on their appraisal of service quantity as well as quality received from servers.
Bodvarsson and Gibson provided an alternative explanation for tipping behavior in 1997. 
They argued that tipping in restaurants is not just a social norm where people tip at the rate of
15% of bill size. They claimed that tipping behavior can be viewed as a game played between 
diners  and  servers.  Using  a  survey, they  gathered  information  from  nearly  700  diners  in  7 
Minnesota restaurants. Their survey evidence suggests that diners will use the rule of thumb as a 
beginning point and then vary the tipping rate depending on the service just received, expected 
future service, whether they dine alone or with a group, alcohol consumption and location of the 
restaurant.
In 2000,  Lynn and McCall used a meta-analysis of seven published and six unpublished 
studies  involving  2547  diners  at  20  different  restaurants  to  re-investigate  the  relationship 
between  tip  size  and  evaluations  of  service.  Their  results  revealed  that  tip  size  and  service 
evaluations are positively and significantly related, but weaker than expected by most people. 
They suggested that restaurant managers should not depend on tips as employees’ economic 
incentive for delivering good service, but still claimed that tippers are concerned about equitable 
exchange relationships.          
In 2003, Conlin, Lynn, and O’Donoghue first investigated the efficiency of observed tipping 
behavior, using survey data to identify a variety of influential factors. They also developed a 
simple theoretical model to illustrate their results. Their empirical findings suggest that tipping 
rate not only depends on service quality but also on other factors, such as repetition, age, group 
size, the frequency of one’s visits to restaurants, and cross-gender interactions. In addition, their 
theoretical model implies an important new idea – the tipping norm serves as a substitute for an 
efficient  tipping  contract.  Finally,  they  claimed  that  their  research  differed  from  previous 
research  that  focused  on  “social  norms”,  by  considering  an  internal  norm  enforced  by 
internalized feelings of guilt and shame. They believe that such internal enforcement clearly 
influences human behavior.
In  2004,  Azar  used  historical  evidence  and  provided  a  different  economic  analysis  to 
investigate why people tip and whether or not tipping improves service quality. He concluded 
that although the reasons for tipping have changed over the years, conforming to social norms 
and avoiding embarrassment are still the primary reasons for tipping. Also, tips can be a good 
incentive for servers to provide good service, implying that tipping may improve service quality. 
In 2006, Kerr, Domazlicky, Kerr, and Knittel provided survey evidence which suggested that 
the relationship between service quality and tip size are not strongly significant. In addition, their 
empirical results reveal that the shorter the time to delivery, the higher the tipping rate. They 3
finally concluded that tipping indeed is subject to strong social norms although service quality 
may affect tip size.   
3. Survey – Evidence from Louisiana 
I developed a questionnaire in August 2003 and sent it to a random sample of 1,000 residents 
in Louisiana. A self-addressed, stamped envelope and $1 participation incentive were enclosed in 
the mailing. In total, 783 residents responded to the questionnaire and returned it within several 
weeks.  Results  for  these  783  residents  are  summarized  and  discussed  in  this  section.  The 
questionnaire included the following questions:
1. Did you ever tip when you dined in a restaurant?
2. Why did you tip?
3. How much did you usually tip servers?
4. Were you always happy when you tipped?
5. If it is not necessary to tip, do you still want to tip?
6. If the restaurant manager sets a special policy that no tips are necessary in a particular 
day, will you order a little bit more expensive dishes than you would normally order on a 
particular day?
7. If the restaurant manager sets a special policy that no tips are necessary in a particular 
period, will you dine in that restaurant during that particular period more often than you 
used to do?
8. In your opinion, do we have to tip?
There were multiple choices for each question, so that people could choose the best response 
from their perspective. To the first question, “Did you ever tip when you dined in a restaurant?”, 
90% of the sample chose “yes, all the time”; 10% chose “yes, sometimes but not all the time”; 
and no one chose “no, never tipped in my life.” To the second question, ”Why did you tip?”, 60% 
of the sample chose “it is a worldwide custom, I desire social approval, so I tipped”; 39% chose 
“servers did services for me, so I tipped”;  and 1% chose “servers asked for tips, so I tipped”.
The results for question 2 may be consistent with those reported by Lynn and Grassman 
(1990) and with psychological theory which suggests that customers may tip because they are 
guided by certain social norms and expectations. They feel guilty if they do not tip. In other 
words, many customers tipped in order to ensure social approval. 
To the third question, “How much did you usually tip servers?”, 58% of the sample chose 
“15%-20% of the total bill size”; and 42% chose “no certain amount but it is related to the total 
bill size.” This result is consistent with Bodevarsson and Gibson’s (1994) conclusion that tips 
depend on bill size because bill size and service quantity are highly correlated. To the fourth 
question, “Were you always happy when you tipped?”, 35% of the sample chose “Yes, I was 
always happy because I appreciated their services”; 64% chose “No, not really but it would be 
okay to me”; and 1% chose “No, I hated to tip although I did.”   
To the fifth question, “If it is not necessary to tip, do you still want to tip?”, 34% of the 
sample chose  “Yes,  I  still want  to tip  because  they  deserve  it”;  64%  chose  “Maybe,  but  it 
depends on how much services that they have done for me”; and 2% chose “No, I am absolutely 
not going to tip.” This question might not have been clear due to the lack of a definition of the 
reason for not tipping. If the reason is that the costs of services are already covered in the price of 
the dish, then customers are not supposed to tip. The restaurant owner should bear the costs (i.e., 
raising servers’ wage rate).   4
To the  sixth  question,  “If  the  restaurant  manager  sets  a  special policy  that  no  tips  are 
necessary in a particular day, will you order a little bit more expensive dishes than you would 
normally order on a particular day?”, 15% of the sample chose “Yes, I will”; 78% chose “No, I 
won’t”; and 7% chose “I don’t know”. To the seventh question, “If the restaurant manager sets a 
special policy that no tips are necessary in a particular period, will you dine in that restaurant 
during that particular period more often than you usually do?”, 20% of the sample chose “Yes, I 
will”;  68%  chose  “No,  I  won’t”;  and  12%  chose  “I  don’t  know”.  Questions  6  and  7  were 
designed to ascertain consumers’ demand behavior. It was expected that most customers would 
choose “Yes, I will”; however, the answer appeared to be the opposite. One reason could be that 
diners usually order the same kinds of entrees or spend the same amount of money. Our sense is 
that the apparent independence of food purchases from the tip rate reflects the notion that tip 
costs are sufficiently low in the diner’s budget for changes in the tipping rate to not really impact 
overall expenditures much (in the same way that a change in the price of toothpicks will not 
affect the demand for other goods in the household’s budget). This would appear to support the 
belief  that  the  tip  elasticity  of  demand  is  less  than  unity.  Therefore,  even  if  the  restaurant 
manager offers some promotion, such as no tips required, consumers still do not change their 
consumer behavior.  
To the last question, “In your opinion, do we have to tip?”, 51% of the sample chose “Yes, 
we do have to tip”; 38% chose “No, we do not have to tip”; and 11% chose “I don’t know”. 
Survey results show that most people still think that restaurant tipping is necessary whether or 
not it is a worldwide custom or for some other reason. 
Furthermore, to gain more information about tipping from restaurant owners/managers and 
servers, I  intentionally  dined  in 165  different  restaurants (excluding fast-food restaurants)  in 
Louisiana  within  ten  months  from  February–November  2003.  I  interviewed  162  restaurant 
owners/managers and 427 servers while dining in these restaurants. Restaurant owners/managers
were asked five questions. They were:
1. Do you believe that your customers always tip your servers?
2. How much per hour do you pay for your servers?
3. If your customers no longer tip your servers, will you pay for your servers at a higher 
wage rate?
4. If your customers no longer tip your servers, will you raise the prices of dishes or meals? 
(Assume that all other costs of dishes/meals do not change.)
5. For some reason (e.g. customers no longer tip servers), you have to raise the prices of 
dishes/meals, do you believe that you probably will lose some customers?      
There were multiple choices for each question so that interviewees could choose the best 
response  from  their  perspective.  To the  first  question,  “Do  you  believe  that  your customers 
always tip your servers?”, 94% of the sample chose “Yes” and 6% chose “No”. To the second 
question, “How much per hour do you pay for your servers?”, 75.5% of the sample chose “$2.00 
- $3.50”; 18.5% chose “$3.51 - $5.00”; and 6% chose “more than $5.00”. Questions 1 and 2 are 
related. From the evidence, we learn that most restaurant owners/managers believe that their 
customers always tip their servers, so they do not have to pay their servers a high wage rate. That 
is, most restaurant owners/managers believe that the tip is the price of the server’s service and 
that customers should pay for it. 
To the third question, “If your customers no longer tip your servers, will you pay for your 
servers at a higher wage rate?”, 78% of the sample chose “Yes, I will”; and 22% chose “No, I 
won’t”. To the fourth question, “If your customers no longer tip your servers, will you raise the 5
prices of dishes or meals? (Assume that all other costs of dishes/meals do not change.)”, 66.5% 
of the sample chose “Yes, I will”; and 33.5% chose “No, I won’t”. To the fifth question, “For 
some reason (e.g. customers longer tip servers), you have to raise the prices of dishes/meals, do 
you believe that you probably will lose some customers?”, 46.5% of the sample chose “Yes, I 
believe so”; 28.5% chose “No, I don’t believe so”; and 25% chose “I don’t know”. Questions 3 –
5 are also related. Most restaurant owners/managers realize that if customers no longer tip their 
servers, they have to raise servers’ wage rate so that servers still can work for them. But, they 
have to shift the costs of servers’ services to customers by increasing the prices for dishes or 
meals. However, many restaurant owners/managers are aware that an increase in the prices for
dishes/meals would result in fewer customers. 
In addition, two questions relating to servers were added to the questionnaire. These two 
questions were:
1. According to your experience, what is the percentage of your customers who never tip 
you?
2. According to your experience, what is the percentage of your customers who tip you at 
least 15% of the total bill size?      
To  the  first  question,  “According  to  your  experience,  what  is  the  percentage  of  your 
customers who never tip you?”, 98.5% of the sample chose “0%” and 1.5% chose “1% - 5%”. To
the second question, “According to your experience, what is the percentage of your customers 
who tip you at least 15% of the total bill size?”, 15% of the sample chose “above 80%”; 58.5% 
chose “60% - 80%”; 24.5% chose “40% - 59%”; and 2% chose “below 40%”. Based on this 
evidence, we almost can guarantee that every server would receive tips from diners whether they 
were happy to tip or not. In addition, most diners would tip servers at least 15% of the total bill 
size. 
4. Social norms and tipping rate
According to the survey evidence, most diners leave tips in order to obtain social approval. In 
other words, after leaving a tip, diners feel “peaceful” or “not guilty”. For this reason, social 
norms create costs for diners, because diners would feel guilty if they did not tip after dining at a 
restaurant  and they  may  be penalized  for  not acting according  to  “social  norms”. The costs 
(denoted as C) created by social norms (called “social norm costs”) are related to total bill size 
(denoted as B), which can be written asC c B   , where c is the marginal cost of social norms.
Note that if we can quantify the social norms, their size can be equal to total bill size. Hence, the 
more the diner orders, the larger the social norms. 
The marginal cost of social norms is mainly determined by three factors: (1) A general rate 
t0 0   (e.g., 15%) paid by other people due to the social norms. t0is the most important factor 
that  determines  how  much  the  diner  would  like  to  pay  for  the  cost.  In  addition, 
  c t0 0  and 
2
0
2 0 c t  .  (2) The diner’s generosity or stinginess 0. Normally, generous 
people would feel guilty relative to stingy people because generous people’s behavior would be 
easily affected by social norms – they care much about what other people think. Thus, they want 
to pay more to compensate for their guilty feelings in order to feel less guilty or more peaceful. 
On the other hand,  stingy people do not care much about what other people think, so, their 
behavior is less affected by social norms. Thus, they don’t need to pay more to make them feel 
more peaceful or less guilty. Accordingly, if the diner is quite generous, then 1; if the diner is 6
quite stingy, then 1; if the diner is just like all other people (not quite generous or stingy), 
then 1;  however,  if  the  diner  is  extremely  stingy, may  be  equal  to  0.  In  addition, 
  c  0and 
2 2 0 c  . (3) The diner’s general feelings about the server  0. Note that the 
reason for using the general feelings about the server rather than “service quality” is the lack of
standard criteria by which to identify “good” or “bad” quality service. Normally when we have 
good feelings about servers, it means that the servers make us happy. The more happy feelings 
we have, the more guilt we will have, because our behavior is more affected by social norms. 
Therefore, we want to pay more to compensate for our guilt. Hence, if the diner has a good 
feeling about the server, then 1; if the diner has a bad feeling about the server, then 1; if 
the diner has a normal feeling about the server, then 1; however, if the diner has a strong bad 
feeling  about  the  server  (strongly  dissatisfied),   may  be  equal  to  0.  In  addition, 
  c  0and 
2 2 0 c  . According to these three factors, the marginal cost of social norms 
can be specified as follows:
      c c t t   0 0 , ,    
 
,                                                                     (1)
where0 1     ,  are exogenous variables. Note that the second and third factors ( and ) are 
derived factors. Without social norms, these two factors cannot exist independently. Therefore, it 
would  be incorrect  to  specify  the  marginal  cost  of  social  norms  linearly,  such  as: 
c t    0  
  .           
Moreover, the diner’s feeling of “peaceful” (denoted as ⒋ ) equals total tips paid by the diner 
minus total costs of social norms. Therefore, the diner’s “peaceful” ⒋  function (or “not guilty” 
function) can be illustrated as follows:
                     t B c B t P X c t P X X X 1 1 0     , , ,                   (2)
where stands for a sales tax rate,  PX stands for the price of the meal, and X stands for the size of 
the meal. 
To solve the diner’s problem, we maximize equation (2) by taking the first derivative with 







 0 0, ,   .                                                                      (3)
As equation (3) shows, the tipping rate is equal to the marginal cost of social norms and is a 
function of t0, Б , and Ў ; i.e.,   t t t
  0, ,   , and  tt0 ,  t ,  t  > 0. Based on the result, we can 
figure out why some diners leave a larger tip while others leave a smaller tip. If the diner is quite 
generous and/or has a good feeling about the server, then the diner will provide a tip that is more 
than 15% of the total bill size to the server. On the other hand, if the server is quite stingy and/or 
has a bad feeling about the server, the diner may tip less than 15% of the total bill size.
However, some may argue that patronage frequency may also affect the tipping rate. That is, 
frequent  customers  tip  more  than  infrequent  customers  (Lynn  and  Grassman,  1990).  My
alternative explanation for this fact is specified as follows. If a diner dines at the same restaurant 
more than once, he or she must either enjoy the food or the service or both. Thus, after the 
customer and the server get to know each other, customers become more generous (i.e.,) 
and/or have a better feeling about the same servers (i.e., ). Therefore, the social norm costs 
for these customers increase. For this reason, they will want to pay higher costs (i.e., tips) to 
compensate for their “guilty feeling” in order to make them feel less guilty (or more peaceful). In 
other words, “tips” and “guilty feeling” trade off. 7
Moreover,  some  economists  argue  that tipping  is  the  most  efficient  way  to  monitor  and 
reward servers’ efforts (e.g., Bodvarsson and  Gibbson, 1994; Jacob and  Page, 1980),  which 
implies  that  monitoring  and  rewarding  efforts  are  the  primary  reason  for  diner  tipping.
Nevertheless, I do not support this argument. According to the survey evidence in the previous 
section, 98.5% of servers always received tips and only 1.5% of servers did not receive tips all 
the time (but this was very unusual). In addition, most servers always received at least 15% of 
the total bill size. The evidence shows that almost all diners leave tips and at least 15% of the bill 
size no matter what the service quality is, implying that every diner is still guided by the social 
norms. Accordingly, as longs as social norms exist in society, monitoring and rewarding cannot 
be the primary reason for diner tipping, because servers already expect that diners will tip around 
15% of the bill size, good service quality or not. Lynn and McCall (2000) came to the same 
conclusion: the relationship between tip size and service evaluation is weaker than expected, 
implying that tips cannot be the sole incentive for servers to offer good service.       
Above all, I believe that social norm is the main reason for diner tipping. A repeated game 
cannot be the reason for tipping. Suppose that our society has no social norms, no matter how 
generous the diner is, how good his/her feelings are toward the server, and how frequently s/he
dines at the same restaurant, there is no economic reason for a rational diner to tip, because  t0is 
always equal to 0. For example, in Australia, China, Denmark, Japan, and Iceland, restaurant 
tipping  does  no  occur,  because  there  are  no  such  social  norms  in  these  societies.  As  long 
ast0 0  , the marginal cost of social norms will become zero, and thus the tipping rate will be 
equal to zero. Although the survey evidence shows that 39% of the sample chose “servers did 
service for me, so I tipped”, these people are still guided by certain social norms. As a result,
they’ll still pay around 15%, the general rate paid by other people due to social norms. In other 
words, due to social norms, the economic behavior between diners and servers cannot be viewed 
as a game.                    
5. Further discussion
Since  consumer  behavior  is  affected  by  social  norms,  an  interesting  implied  question 
emerges: Do tips create excess burden (i.e., deadweight loss) in the restaurant food market? 
This question is debatable. On the one hand, due to social norms, diners not only pay for the 
meal but also pay for the tips (i.e., social norm costs). Thus, tipping (or social norms) negatively 
affects consumer demand for restaurant meals, which in turn results in a substitution effect. As 
long as a substitution effect exists, there will be a loss in well-being (i.e., excess burden) caused 
by the substitution effect of a price-distorting tip. In other words, the social norms distort the 
price, and thus the final price paid by diners is no longer economically efficient. As a result, a
deadweight loss is created. Simply speaking, when diners pay after finishing their meal, at that 
moment, they find that the total cost of the meal is higher than the price shown on the menu, 
which may discourage them. 
On the other hand, some may argue that tips are just another part of the cost of dining out. 
That is, tips are the price of the server’s service. When diners dine in a restaurant, they indeed 
consume two goods (restaurant food and servers’ services) simultaneously. In other words, two 
different markets (restaurant food and servers’ services) exist at the same time in a restaurant. As 
long as diners realize that in a restaurant they consume two different goods simultaneously and 
that tips are the price of the server’s service, a substitution effect of a price-distorting tip will not 8
occur in the restaurant food market. When the substitution effect does not exist, customers will 
not experience a loss in well-being (i.e., excess burden).
In addition, one may argue that if consumers’ decision to pay lower or no tips would affect 
the supply of servers. Restaurant owners would be forced to pay higher wages to servers, which 
in turn would affect the prices for meals/dishes. I personally believe that this will not actually 
occur because most consumers are still tipping servers at 15 – 20% of total bill size. According 
to  survey  evidence  reported  in  the  previous  section,  60%  of  consumers  still  believe  that 
restaurant tipping is a worldwide custom, reflecting a desire for social approval; and 40% still 
believe that servers perform services for them. Further, based on this same survey evidence, 
many restaurant owners realize that if they raise the prices for meals/dishes, they will probably 
lose both the customers who do not wish to pay more for meals and those who are reluctant to 
tip. 
6. Conclusion
In this paper, I offered alternative economic viewpoints and analysis in a look at restaurant 
tipping behavior. A survey of Louisiana residents was conducted to collect public opinions about
tipping. In addition to the survey evidence, a thoughtful discussion of social norms was offered
to explain why diners tip. As a result, I concluded that social norms are the primary reason for 
diner tipping, because diners are guided by certain social norms. As long as consumer behavior 
is guided by social norms, social norms will create costs for diners. After paying such costs (i.e., 
tips), diners will feel less guilty or more peaceful.
In addition, since consumer behavior is impacted by social norms, an implied question was 
discussed: Do tips create excess burden (i.e., deadweight loss) in the restaurant food market? The 
discussion suggests that if customer’s tipping behavior is completely guided by social norms and 
tips  are  not  treated  as  the  costs  of  servers’  services,  tips  will  create  excess  burden  in  the 
restaurant  food  market;  nevertheless,  if  tips  are  completely  treated  as  the  cost  of  servers’ 
services, tips will not create excess burden in the restaurant food market.   
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